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The War Everyone Won
It has been exactly a year since the NATO aggression on Yugoslavia. All parties in the conflict
claim victory. But, in fact, they switched goals, pretending to have gained whatever they had wanted
from the very beginning. With a little help from propaganda, this could be sold out easily. The
problem is that such a policy does not lead towards a solution to the crisis.
The regime in Belgrade has had only one goal from the onset of the country's breakup - to
remain in power. People in the regime have come to power with a pretence of defending the interests
of the Serbs in Kosovo, and during the NATO aggression they managed to remain in power as they
actually defended Kosovo by the military. They lost Kosovo and one insolvable problem along with
it, but they have maintained the credibility of their policy towards Kosovo. That enables them to still
remain in power. 
It appears that the prevailing goal of the international community was to end the Balkan crisis
once and for all, which had started with the separation and early recognition of Slovenia. That goal
was not reached, but a humanitarian problem of refugees emerged in the meantime, giving
additional legitimacy to military intervention.
The Albanians in Kosovo wanted an independent state and at that time it appeared to be their
last chance. They did not get it, but are now free from Belgrade's influence. Supported by the
international community, they will realize their goal more easily. Problems like drug trafficking and
local military commanders who are beyond civilian control still remain.
The Serbs in Serbia had no wish to live in Kosovo, but were willing to die for it. That is not easily
understood without some knowledge of history. The long-lasting process of the country's
disintegration only increased their wish to prevent any further change of borders. They failed to
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FRY 1999 1999 II 2000 II 2000 II 2000 I-II 2000
Basic Economic Indicators 1998 I 2000 II 1999 I-II 1999
GDP - USD million 14.224a) -19.3% … … … …
Montenegro … … … … … …
Serbia … … … … … …
GDP per capita - USD 1.699a) -19.1% … … … …
Montenegro … … … … … …
Serbia … … … … … …
Central Serbia … … … … … …
Vojvodina … … … … … …
Industrial Production … -24.1% … 20.7% -5.1% -8.9%
Montenegro … -7.6% … -1.9% -8.1% -4.5%
Serbia … -25.6% … 22.4% -4.9% -10.7%
Central Serbia … -24.5% … 19.1% -2.8% -7.9%
Vojvodina … -28.2% … 31.4% -9.4% -16.8%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% 85 0.7% -33.3% -34.0%
Montenegro 154 -14.1% 158 7.4% -5.2% -3.9%
Serbia 102 -33.8% 80 -0.2% -36.3% -37.0%
Unemployment Rate 27.3% 8.3% … … … …
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% … … … …
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% 27.1% 1.1% … …
Export - USD million 1.498 -46.9% 112.0 8.0% -27.4% -35.6%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 6.5 -63.9% -21.2% 21.0%
Serbia 1.375 -48.9% 105.0 23.1% -28.1% -37.0%
Import - USD million 3.296 -30.3% 244.0 -19.8% -13.4% -16.1%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 13.0 -44.0% -39.7% -43.8%
Serbia 2.938 -33.2% 230.0 -17.8% -11.2% -12.9%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 17.2 4.2% 53.7% 52.3%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 6.0 -1.6% 27.7% 31.5%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 11.2 7.7% 72.3% 67.4%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 686 -2.7% -42.4% -42.7%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 4.55% 12.6% -33.3% -38.02%
Retail prices … 42.4% … 1.8% 52.6% 52.4%
Montenegro … 60.1% … 2.8% 132.0% 131.1%
Serbia … 41.1% … 1.6% 47.8% 47.7%
Cost of living … 44.9% … 2.2% 60.8% 60.2%
Montenegro … 67.2% … 4.0% 145.8% 144.8%
Serbia … 43.5% … 2.0% 54.9% 54.3%
Industrial prices … 44.2% … … … …
Montenegro … 63.7% … … … …
Serbia … 43.2% … … … …
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 21.0 5.0% 134.1% 137.7%
a) Official statistics, without Kosovo, unreliable
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accomplish that, but there will be no more changes of borders after the Kosovo conflict. The Serbs
in Kosovo required protection. Instead, they became refugees or subject to permanent attacks and
mistreatment. They are the only ones who claim no victory in the war.
NATO was intended to play the role of the Rambouillet Accords implementer, but the sequence
of events placed its credibility in focus. That crisis of credibility demanded intervention more than
security or humanitarian reasons. The alliance's unity has been preserved, but for the first time
such one-sided action was conducted outside of the defensive alliance and without prior UN
consent. Consequences were unexpected. The war was victorious and NATO was de facto enlarged
to all neighboring countries - far before it was expected or desired.
Prior to the intervention, the Yugoslav Army was completely suppressed by the police. It failed
to defend the country's territorial integrity, although it bravely entered the war against a much
stronger enemy. It lost the war, but regained dignity and respect thanks to low-ranking officers, not
the generals. The regime will now try to discredit the army again in internal political conflicts, which
will contribute to further disintegration within the country.
Part of the opposition intended to use the Kosovo problem as a means to participate in the
government and prove themselves capable of resolving serious state problems. Instead, it was
proved that cooperation with the regime could exist only by serving its daily interests. However, the
opposition is left with a possibility to become victorious at the forthcoming elections if it
demonstrates itself to be a credible alternative to the government. To achieve that, it is not sufficient
to become united in a single list, the opposition must also offer solutions to the citizens' concrete
problems. Kosovo is only a part of that story.
Futile hopes and statements
June 10, 2000 marks the anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244
on Kosovo. It will be extended by automatically, as it requires the Security Council to vote
unanimously for its cancellation in order to suspend its extension. The Yugoslav authorities'
expectation that somebody will vote against extension in the Security Council is completely out of
the question as, even in that case, the Resolution will be extended for another year.
Claims of the Yugoslav generals on an immanent return to Kosovo are also out of the question.
Even in the case of an agreed return, as foreseen by the Resolution, but without any precise date,
it will involve only several hundred policemen, personnel for marking & clearing minefields, liaison
officers and customs officials. 
The Yugoslav authorities are right to complain that the UN Resolution paragraph on territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the FRY has not been respected. Nevertheless, they ignore the fact that
this paragraph is always related to the paragraph on “full respect” of the Rambouillet Accords. 
To understand this claim we have to go back to the beginning of the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia. That was an atypical case in international relations. Therefore, an atypical solution was
applied. It contains three key moments:
1. The approach of the Badintaire Commission which granted the right to separation to
formerly Yugoslav republics and stipulated that the internal administrative borders would become
external state borders. That was not set out in the Helsinki Final Act.
2. The Dayton Accord modified this precedent. One republic was granted the right to become
an independent state, but it was temporarily placed under international protectorate.
3. Within a new state, nationally homogenous “entities” were formed so as to maintain the
multiethnic character of the whole state. 
Yugoslavia has never ratified the Dayton Accord, but it signed and recognized it de facto. The
Rambouillet Accord is a copy of the Dayton Accord by its principles. This accord was not signed by
the Yugoslav party, but UN Resolution 1244 lent it legal force. The Yugoslav party has accepted the
Resolution, thereby signing the Rambouillet Accords indirectly.
According to the Resolution, the international community has taken on the obligation to control
borders, provide for the full security of all citizens, the peaceful and safe return of all refugees,
economic reconstruction, and the creation of democratic institutions within the broad principle of
self-government for Kosovo. Local elections will be held next fall followed by elections for Kosovo's
parliament later next year. 
Necessary democratic institutions
Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish democratic self-governing institutions. The Rambouillet
Accords will serve as a basis for that. UN Resolution 1244 uses the expression “taking full account
of the Rambouillet Accords,” which grants certain liberty in its implementation. The most important
change should refer to Article 8, which allows the change of municipal borders, but only on the
basis of a decision by the Kosovo Parliament. The situation concerning the Serbs' security is such
that certain municipal borders should be changed even before the Kosovo Parliament is established,
thus providing regional self-governance for the Serbs. Unless this occurs, municipal elections will
fail to contribute to calming the situation in Kosovo.
That is one condition. The other refers to KFOR's commitment to provide for the security of all
citizens in Kosovo, in accordance with Paragraph 9 (c) and (d) of the Resolution. The challenge will
probably emerge in the summer when around 60,000 refugees are expected to move from Preshevo
to Kosovo and the territory primarily inhabited by Serbs. The third legitimate request originates
from Paragraph 9 (g) of the Resolution on efficient border monitoring duties. It presumes the
prevention of the KLA from entering the south Serbian territory. The fourth request refers to
Paragraph 9 (b) and Paragraph 15 on requirements for demilitarization of the KLA. Conflicts in
south Serbia prove that KFOR has so far failed to demilitarize the KLA completely.
The opposition's requests for strict respect of UN Resolution 1244 are both legitimate and
useful, but not sufficient. Implementation of the Resolution assumes the establishment of
democratic institutions before a political accord on the final status of Kosovo is reached. If the
opposition wishes to become actively involved in this process, it should do everything possible to
win the elections. Only democratic changes will improve the negotiating position of Serbia, offering
realistic prospects that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia will be preserved at the
future international conference on Kosovo.
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The Public Revenue System in Serbia -
Flight from Market Orientation
If today a poll were to be conducted among citizens in Serbia on whether they consider the tax
system just, most of them would probably give a negative answer. That would, of course, not
represent a specific Serbian feature, nor could it be evidence in itself of the population’s political
disposition. The old warning of Berk that “A human being cannot be taxed and satisfied, just like it
cannot love and keep a sane mind”, can be applied in large measure even to developed countries,
with long parliamentary tradition and efficient budget control.
The tax system in Serbia is characterized by circumstance in which citizens seldom have an
opportunity to pay public duties directly: the share of these payments in total public revenue
amounts to only about 10%. As opposed to all OECD member countries, and most countries
undergoing transition,  there is no global (synthetic) income tax in Serbia, one that is determined
by decision of a competent tax authority and based on information from the citizens’ tax reports.
That tax, ranked first by bulk in the taxation structure, has been replaced by schedular taxes on
specific types of income, among which the tax on wages is predominant (82.5% of total collected
schedular taxes). Since earnings are agreed upon in net amounts, the personal income tax (as well
as the contribution to social insurance charged to employees) is actually shifted to the employer. In
fact, a complementary annual citizens’ income tax was introduced in 1999, and charged, along with
an obligatory submission of tax returns, to natural persons whose annual net income surpassed
72,000 dinars (120,000 dinars today). However, due to the high untaxed minimum and the fact that
many potential taxpayers pay flat-rate taxes or have cash (thus unregistered) income, the
complementary tax role becomes negligible. Citizens have direct taxpaying obligations only with
respect to taxes on income based on personal labor, agriculture, forestry, and corresponding
contributions to social insurance, as well as to part of the tax on capital gain and property, dues,
compensation for the use of city land property, compensation for the use of public goods, and
customs duties. All other taxes, contributions, dues and compensations are paid by legal persons –
as direct obligations, as taxpayers in the case of duties paid after deductions, or as obligations that
burden the end consumer with indirect taxes.
Although I estimate that various forms of public revenue accounted for around 55% of the GDP
(measured according to net material product methodology)  in 1999, citizens in Serbia do not have
a clear picture of what taxes touch their lives as a result of complex processes shifting the tax
burden via the market (i.e. whose available income really decrease due to a tax). On the other hand,
there is a widespread sentiment that the fiscal system is unjust. 
Diagnosis
Radical fiscal reform was conducted in Serbia at the beginning of the nineties, with the
intention of introducing a public revenue system that would correspond to systems of taxation in
OECD member countries. It encompassed:
• Replacing the existing system of schedular taxes (and corresponding contributions) on specific
types of revenue, with a global (synthetic) income tax;
• Introducing contributions to compulsory social insurance (paid by both employees and
employers) to finance old-age pensions, health insurance, and unemployment insurance;
• Introducing taxes on corporate capital gain, in place of the Organization of Associated Labor
income tax (later to become the company income tax), which would later be partly integrated with
the citizens’ income tax through mechanisms of relief for stockholders, in by deductions of 50% on
the value of received dividends from the base taxable income;
• Exempting excises on oil, oil derivatives, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, coffee, luxury
goods, etc., from the scope of turnover taxes, and a subsequent reduction of the number of taxation
rates to two (instead of the former several tens);
• Abolition of existing tax privileges (exemptions, relief, special tax regimes, differentiated tax
rates, etc.), to extend the tax bases and enable a reduction in tax rates. 
A replacement of the existing turnover tax in end consumption with a value added tax (VAT)
was also anticipated, however that aspect of the tax reform was postponed until 1995 due to the
necessity of appropriate administrative and technical preparations.
After eight years of operation, the public revenue system in Serbia can be described by the
following features:
1. Instability. The occurrence of changes in tax legislation and sub legislative regulations is
surprisingly frequent, even when all the dramatic political, economic, and social circumstances
which marked Serbian society in the course of the nineties are taken into consideration. For
example, the Law on Income Tax of citizens changed 26 times in the 1992-1999 period (averaging
3.25 times annually), with the schedular system applied initially instead of the global one, giving
way in 1999 to a “steady” application of the mixed taxation model (schedular taxes plus a
complementary progressive tax for taxpayers with extremely high annual net revenue). Regarding
the turnover tax, the irregularity of tax policy had two manifestations: the number of tax rates
increased with time (from two to four), while surtaxes multiplied (first the railroad tax was
introduced, then the 3% city tax, followed by the federal tax for financing defense of the country).
In the case of contributions to compulsory social insurance, initially the whole matter had been
settled by one law, then it was transferred to a corresponding system of laws so that organizations
for compulsory social insurance were authorized to determine the contributions’ rates. This was
followed by regulations on assumed bases for accounting contributions (depending on the
employee’s degree of education, not their actual income), while certain employers had the
opportunity to calculate contributions at 50% of the base. There are many more examples of similar
straying, with many unfavorable consequences for investors with regard to the uncertainty of
conditions in business management.
2. Distortion of tax structure. The portion of particular tax forms in the structure of public
revenues of a country depends upon many factors (economic development, the degree of openness
and market orientation of the economy, governmental organization, market-governed flexibility of
certain taxes, etc.). In OECD member countries as a whole, income tax has the most significant role
(23%), followed by contributions to social insurance (22%). The turnover tax (in the form of a VAT
in all OECD member countries except the USA and Australia) accounts for 16% of public revenue,
while 11% is provided by excises and customs duties. Corporate income taxes account for 8% of
public revenue, while 5% comes from property taxes. The portions of taxes on the use of public
goods and taxes on payrolls are marginal (2% and 1% respectively), while non-tax instruments
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1] Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, FYROM, Moldavia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
2] Transfers in the form of reciprocated payment of contributions among specific organizations of compulsory social insurance are excluded from public revenue. If
contributions to compulsory social insurance and taxes on payrolls, paid by the state in the role of employer, were also excluded, with a conservative estimate that the share
of duties where the state is the employer-debtor amounts to 12% of total like duties, then public revenue would have amounted to 52,6% of GDP in Serbia.
(dues, penalties, private law state revenues) account for around 12% of public revenue.
In Serbia, income taxes (schedular income taxes, daily allowances for solidarity, and
contributions comprise 12% of public revenue – half that of OECD member countries. Contributions
to compulsory social insurance comprise 36% of public revenue, more than 60% above the OECD
average. The absence of a global progressive income tax, the low personal income tax rate (14%), a
significantly lower per capita GDP, and the large scope of the black market economy (where income
tax is not paid), are several factors that account for the fairly small participation of income tax in
the structure of public revenues in Serbia. On the other hand, social contributions represent the
most abundant duty in the system, while the fact that their share in the structure of public
revenues is three times that of the income tax can be partially understood by considering that social
contributions burden incomes with the unusually high rate – 53.2%. Around 47,5% of public
revenue in Serbia comes from the taxation of labor, mainly due to the role of contributions to
compulsory social insurance. The strain upon labor is even larger when indirect taxes (turnover
taxes, excises, etc.) are taken into consideration, which shift per definitionem to the end consumers.
The share of company income tax in the public revenue structure in Serbia is 1% - eight times
less than in OECD member countries - which demonstrates not only the bad state of the Serbian
economy, but also that regulations have enabled an erosion of the tax base.
The share of property taxes (taxes on real estate and land, capital levies, death duties, gift taxes,
taxes on the transfer of absolute rights, dues and solidarity contributions for transactions in
payment operations) in the public revenue structure in Serbia recorded large growth in 1999, after
the mentioned dues and contributions were introduced with a collective rate of 0.3%. It marked an
increase from 2% to 3%, but remained lower than the OECD average of 5%. 
Turnover taxes (on goods and services operations, the federal sales tax for the financing of
defense, railroad tax and a 3% city tax) have a 23% share in Serbian public revenue relative to a
16% chare in OECD member countries. This can be explained not only by the fact that the share of
indirect taxes in the public revenue system of a country is, generally, larger as per capita GDP falls,
but also by the fact that the collective standard turnover tax rate in Serbia reaches 30%, while the
average standard VAT rate in OECD member countries is around 18% - a little more than the lower
collective turnover tax rate in Serbia (which is 17%). However, it is curious that the share of excises
(including various compensations for oil and oil derivatives, alcoholic beverages, and cigarettes) and
customs duties is almost equal, though as per the general correlation of a larger share of indirect
taxes in underdeveloped countries, it should have been larger in Serbia. This discrepancy alludes
to the very large scope of contraband activities. 
The share of taxes on the use of goods (taxes on cellular phones, weapons and motor vehicles,
compensations for the use of city land, compensations for the use of public goods, exit fees for
traveling abroad) is 50% larger in Serbia than in OECD member countries, while the share of taxes
on payrolls (communal compensation, housing contribution) is 200% larger.
Various fees (court, administrative, and communal), penalties and private law public revenues
have a 7% share in the public revenue structure in Serbia, as compared to the 12% share they have
in the public revenue structure of OECD member countries. 
3. Non-neutrality. It is an open question as to whether the socialist regime in Serbia ever
believed in an authentic market economy. However, the tax reform of 1991 was conceived as a
framework for conducting a largely neutral tax policy, which centered on an abolition of existing tax
relief. The system retained incentives that were closely related to certain criteria (e.g. foreign
investment stimulation, capital market development, improvement of ecological conditions, etc.). By
the end of the decade, instead of a market economy, the goal was apparently set on establishing a
command economy, which called for a totally different tax policy – one that would stifle the process
of market allocation. Many a tax relief was gradually built into the tax system favoring specific
branches of economic activity, even specific taxpayers, and discriminating against all the rest. I will
mention only some of the most distinctive non-neutral features:
- the standard turnover tax rate on certain products of domestic manufacture (cosmetics and
hygiene items, shoes, clothes, underwear, personal cars up to 1.2-1.4 liters active volume) was
halved by government decree. Thus, contrary to the rules of GATT (now WTO), imported articles
were discriminated against;
- long-term capital gain achieved by legal persons is taxed at half the amount of long-term
capital gain by natural persons;
- the daily allowance for solidarity was applied only to personal income (and not all at that) and
pensions, so that natural persons who obtain other forms of income are thus favored. Moreover, in
defining the tax rate for this duty, the legislature opted for so-called global progression (where rates
fall within the scope of 3.85% and 23.08%), which leads to the strange effect that a taxpayer earning
1 dinar more than the set limit between two tax units (installments) must to pay the higher rate
with respect to the whole amount earned;
- around two thirds of taxpayers pay a lump sum on income from independent economic
activity, which does not reflect the real economic power of the entrepreneur in a majority of cases;
- specific employers are allowed to calculate contributions to social insurance, which is their
burden, at 50% of the established base;
- tax authorities have the discretion to approve postponement of arrears for certain taxpayers.
4. Unjustness. Two basic criteria have developed in financial literature for estimating the
degree of justness in tax policy. Namely, taxes must provide: a) horizontal justness, which implies
that taxpayers of equal economic potential should be equally burdened with tax, and b) vertical
justness, which implies that taxpayers of larger economic power should pay higher taxes.
Horizontal equality has been disrupted by numerous cases of exemption from the taxation
regime which have been implemented by law or executive decree. The problem becomes more acute
when accounting for the fact that around 40% of GDP is produced in the black market. Two forms
of tax evasion mark this sector. 
The first form is standard in nature and can be encountered in almost all countries (to a smaller
or larger extent): it concerns taxpayers who violate regulations in different ways. The ones who abide
by regulations, however, are subject to harsh – and unjust – taxation. Moreover, they are obliged to
immediately deposit their daily cash earnings to a business account, and allowed to withdraw only
an amount that does not surpass USD 10 in dinars daily.
The second form of tax evasion is characteristic of societies where the rule of law is weak, and
public interest is not differentiated from private interest. Certain members of the nomenclature
engage in illegal activities of wide scope (cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, oil derivatives), and in other
forms of “grey” or “black” activities (street currency market, pegging, etc.) with approval from the
authorities. It is not a rare case that the Payments Bureau (ZOP) is given directives by phone to
release untaxed income for privileged indebted taxpayers. Tax moral erodes completely in such an
environment, while selective campaigns of the Financial Police against taxpayers that incline
towards evasion are more a warning of the danger of political abuse over public revenue control
than measures to increase the scope of payments. Sometimes we have to wonder about the
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underlying motives of certain taxation policy measures. For example, at the end of 1999 there was
a drastic decrease of excise tax on tobacco products (from 70%, 50%, and 40% to 4%) and hard
liquors (from 30% to 3%, and from 50% to 4%). Simultaneously, these items were transferred to the
group of items with a lower collective turnover tax rate (17% instead of 30%). Such solutions led to
the paradox that the excise on beer became 3,3 times, and the excise on wine 66,67% higher than
the excise on brandy. These measures were intended as a blow to cigarette and hard liquor
contraband from Montenegro or abroad into Serbia, which indeed became less profitable. However,
it is questionable whether these kinds of measures - which lessened excises on tobacco and hard
liquor to an extent that is hardly encountered anywhere else in the world - can be sustained in the
taxation system for long. 
The Law on Special Conditions and Clearing Fiscal Arrears further eroded the tax base,
disrupted horizontal equality and undermined tax ethics. Its solutions are discriminatory in two
ways. Firstly, they amnesty all taxpayers that fall into the so-called “economic category” of their due
and unpaid tax debts and of the 100% interest rate on tax debt. On the other hand, the Government
retains the right to grant tax amnesty and more favorable conditions (undefined by law) to either
public, or other kinds of companies, according to its own preference. Taxpayers that have duly paid
their tax obligations are left under the impression that they made a serious mistake: respecting the
law does not pay in this country. Thus it can be expected that this regulation will encourage both
law-abiding and non-abiding taxpayers to forgo paying arrears in the future. 
Vertical equality cannot be accomplished until the existing system of schedular tax is replaced
by a global (synthetic) income tax for natural persons. Presently, proportional taxes are dominant
with the exception of the daily allowance for solidarity. As mentioned above, a complementary
progressive annual income tax was introduced for the first time in 1999. However, the high
untaxable minimum resulted in a fairly small number of taxpayers and a negligible effect of the tax.
Since progressive income taxation for natural persons makes sense only if it is widely applied, in
terms of both the public and its own provisions , I can conclude that its role is not fulfilled in Serbia.
Distribution of the tax burden, after introducing daily allowances for solidarity and the annual
income tax, is more or less accidental: some social groups (e.g. those with large income) are
drastically affected, while others – of equal or larger economic potential but a different income
structure – get by more favorably.
5. Non-transparency. The public revenue system in Serbia is marked by outstanding non-
transparency, characteristic of non-market economies.
Firstly, in choosing forms of taxation, comparability with tax systems of countries with
developed market economies was not achieved. The fiscal reform in 1991 was based on the
postulate of achieving such comparability. Although a synthetic (global) income tax was introduced
in 1991, its implementation was systematically postponed up until 1998 (schedular tax was used
in the meantime), when it was abolished and replaced by today’s mixed model of citizens’ income
taxation. Our public revenue system does not have a VAT. The initial plan for its implementation in
1995 was postponed until 2001. Along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FR of Yugoslavia remains
the only European country that does not apply a VAT as a form of turnover tax. Meanwhile, the
single-phase retail turnover tax is kept, while the number of tax rates increased from two to four.
Calculating contributions to social insurance has become extraordinarily complicated since 1997.
Secondly, the public revenue system has become extremely fragmented. While the Law on
Public Revenue and Expenditure initially listed public duties that had been approved, in time, by
way of special laws and even sublegal enactments  new forms of public revenue were introduced to
the system which made the relevant provisions of the Law on Public Revenue and Expenditure “a
dead letter.” There are now three surtaxes on the existing turnover tax (for financing railroads,
defense of the country, and the city tax in Belgrade), various “compensations” for oil derivatives,
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, “contributions” and “fees” on transactions in payment
operations, the compensation for use of radio and TV channel frequencies, the daily solidarity
allowance, etc. As many as 230 different taxes, contributions, fees, and compensations are in my
database at the moment, and it is possible that new ones will be added.
Thirdly, non-transparency of the public revenue system in Serbia is reflected by numerous tax
privileges and special regimes imposed by law, sublegal enactments, and even unofficial
instructions. The tendency is clear: in order to achieve a certain economic and political goal, the
Government prefers the use of tax expenditures to budget subsidies, conscious that tax expenditure
is, by its nature, less conspicuous than direct public expenditure which should be exposed in the
budget. Hence, the real scope of privileges granted to certain taxpayers remains concealed from the
general public. 
Further development
No changes to these unfavorable tendencies in fiscal policy are expected while the present
ruling coalition holds a majority in parliament. The main features of the public revenue system –
instability, non-neutrality, non-transparency and unjustness – will not alter. The first three are the
best examples of the distance we keep from a market model.
It can be expected with considerable certainty that the implementation of the federal Law on a
VAT will be postponed (it will not be applicable on Montenegrin territory, also, tax administration
was never formed on the federal level, nor does it – in the case of Serbia – dispose of the informative
and technical base needed to administer a VAT). No changes are to be expected in the domain of
citizens’ income tax either, since the current basically schedular system with proportional tax rates
protects interests of the nomenclature, while the complementary annual income tax has a
demagogic role: nominally, there exists progressive taxation, although the scope of this tax is, in
fact, minor. 
I am convinced that the practice of introducing various “compensations” and “fees” on different
products will continue with the revenue used for covering deficits in the pension fund and maybe
even the social security fund.  Also, the number of new tax forms, especially the destined ones, will
increase even further. The policy of selective tax relief will continue, to favor certain privileged
taxpayers while the fiscal burden will fall upon others, however inconspicuous, who should be
discriminated against as per the assessment of the authorities. When the Government concludes
that the desired effects have been achieved, that the blows directed to smugglers – in Montenegro
or outsiders within the republic – of hard liquor and cigarettes have been productive, an increase
of excise rates on these items can be expected. All in all, I am of the opinion that the existing
structure of public revenues will be preserved and dominated by fiscal solutions that mostly affect
labor and that the total participation of public revenue in GDP will persist at the level of around 55%.
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3] The annual income tax does not include interest rates, capital gain, lottery prizes, and income from agriculture and forestry, while dividends were subject to three-fold
taxation in 1999 (up to 90%), then freed from taxation in 2000. The daily solidarity allowance is applied only to certain kinds of wages, and pensions.
4] Contrary to the constitution, which allows the implementation of public duties by law only. See: Art.64 of the Constitution of the FRY, and Art.52 of the Constitution of Serbia.
5] By the end of March 2000, a special compensation on beer was introduced by decree of the Government of Serbia.
Macroeconomic Review
Existing contradictions in economic policy were exacerbated in February while price controls
postponed a statistical rise of inflation. A low tariff burden and rather unrealistic official exchange
rate has modified the import structure. These movements in import will have effects on domestic
production in the months to follow. The high monthly growth of industrial production becomes
relative, when compared to the same period last
year. Money supply has grown due to an
increase of deposits, thus explaining the rise of
the giro rate. 
Prices and wages
Retail price growth in Serbia was 1.6% in
February and 2.8% in Montenegro month-on-
month. In the case of Montenegro, the growth of
retail prices is dropping off after several months
of sharp inflation. This follows the acquisition
of alternative sources of supply following an
embargo imposed by Serbia. Market conditions
have thereby stabilized to a certain extent.
Nevertheless, the structure of price inflation
produced faster growth in living expenses.
Living costs in February rose by 2% in Serbia
and by 4% in Montenegro month-on-month.
At first glance, low retail price growth in
Serbia can not possibly correspond to reality.
The prices of oil derivatives were unfrozen in
February and recorded a growth of 80%. Yet,
according to official statistics for February,
liquid fuels and oils contributed the most to
movements of the total price index (around 7%),
but marked a monthly price growth of only 0.95%. The answer to these contradictory statistics is
simple: the price growth in oil derivatives occurred after the end of price recording, so it was not
included in the government’s price index accounting. A similar situation was later repeated with the
price of medicinal products, which recorded a decrease in February of 2.6% in the territory of FRY.
After incorporating the actual price growth of oil derivatives and medication, two-digit inflation in
March should be expected. Once March inflation statistics are released in-full those who think
inflation which does not appear in statistical reports does not exist will have their illusions
shattered. Even so, the release of complete government statistics on March will reveal only a part
of repressed inflation.
The average monthly wage in Montenegro was 158 DM/mo in February, almost twice the wage
in Serbia, which was 80 DM/mo.
Industry
Industrial production in FRY rose by 20.7% month-on-month in February. In Montenegro it
dropped by 1.9%, while in Serbia it rose by 22.4%. In Serbia proper production rose by 19.1%, and
in Vojvodina by 31.4% month-on-month. It is
interesting that production fell in only 5 sectors
– the power industry (-8.5%), oil and gas
production (-6.2%), iron production (-5.5%),
tobacco production and processing (-2.0%) and
coal production (-1.0%). All other sectors
marked an increase, ranging from +0.9%
(shipbuilding) to +136.8% (wood processing).
This is quite strong growth, even considering the
seasonal upswing of production in February
following the shortened number of working days
in January. 
However, FRY’s industrial production
remains 5.1% down from February, 1999 and
down by 67.9% compared to that of February,
1989.  In Montenegro, production is down 8.1%
year-on-year and down in Serbia 4.9% year-on-
year. In central Serbia production fell by 4.9%
year-on-year and fell in Vojvodina by 9.4% year-
on-year. Using the so-called level index, which
mitigates the effects of accidental factors on the
rise and fall of production by averaging down
the monthly indices, we can confirm the real fall
of production.
According to this more realistic indicator,
the decline in production was somewhat less in
Montenegro at -4.5% than that in Serbia at -
10.7%. In central Serbia production was down
7.9% and down by 16.8% in Vojvodina.  Fifteen sectors showed growth relative to February of last
year - ranging from +1.3% in the power industry to +69.0% in wood processing, while 20 sectors
recorded a decline, ranging from -49.1% in the chemical industry to -1.8% in coal production. 
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Foreign trade
In February, Serbian exports amounted to USD 112 million, two thirds of the export value as
that seen in the same period last year (-36.9%), while imports registered at USD 244 million, a
12.3% drop year-on-year. The trade deficit in February was USD 132 million, while the cumulative
deficit for the first two months of 2000 stood at USD 333 million.
Relative to last year, the import structure has changed considerably as the import of consumer
goods rose in both relative and absolute terms. The
cumulative value of consumer goods imports was
USD 233 million in February, compared to USD 184
million in the same period last year.
This shift resulted from favorable conditions for
import.  Those who import consumer goods use low
tariffs and avoid price control.  In nominal terms,
tariff rates are far from low.  Tariff rates are on the
price expressed in dinars calculated at the official
exchange rate.  The standard tariff rate is 40% plus
a 1% customs notifications fee.  Tariffs can be
modified (i.e. increased by 2.5 times) for certain
goods under a regime of contingencies, bringing
rates to as high as 101%.  However, given the large
discrepancy between official and parallel exchange
rates, the real tariff burden accounts for around
22%.
In a context where foreign currency is sought
by all means – even where export is not
economically justified – the export market is highly
fragmented. Production in FRY is highly dependent
on the import of raw materials and advanced
technology, but exporters often use hard currency
earned on export for the more lucrative import of
consumer goods.  High growth rates are anticipated
in the months to come, largely due to the last year’s
low basis point. Yet, the rising trade deficit –
primarily based in consumer non-durables – is
certain to reflect negatively on the rate of growth in domestic production.
Administrative and quantitative restrictions aimed at reducing these pressures are no longer in
operation.  It appears that the situation in foreign trade is similar to that of price control.  The long-
lasting denial of reality and the regular rescheduling of concrete reform measures have exacerbated
the problem to an extent that fear of the consequences of change postpones any solution to the
problem.
A low tariff on auto imports (12%) and inflationary expectations brought auto imports to first
place in total import value.  The import of oil derivatives saw a large increase (+132.8%), accounted
for by both structural and seasonal variables.  Bulgaria is by far the largest single source of oil
derivatives, magnifying its position in the FRY commercial trade portfolio of late.  In contrast to
January, when electricity was primarily imported from BiH & comprised the largest portion of total
import from that country (49.1%), no further
imports of electricity from BiH were registered in
February.
Montenegrin exports rose by 21% in February
relative to the same period last year, while imports
fell by 43.7%.  The import of oil derivatives was
reduced by 40.8% year-on-year in Montenegro.
It is worth mentioning that according to official
figures, there was no natural gas imported in
January or February.  How revisions to these
figures will transform our analysis is yet to be seen.
Nevertheless, it is certain that if there are no
significant changes in the management of foreign
trade policy or official currency rates, the rising
trade deficit will place increasing – perhaps
unsustainable – pressure in the already strained
dinar’s value.
Monetary movements
Money supply (M1) in February was around 17
billion dinars, reaching at one point the level of 17.4
billion dinars. This means that money supply rose
by almost one billion dinars within the last two
months. What then explains the relatively limited
movement of the black market rate (+10%)? The
answer is in the changing structure of M1.
Specifically, deposits rose by 1.7 billion dinars in
February while cash holdings dropped by around
700 million dinars. This is reflected in the
movement of the black market and giro rates. The
giro rate reached 29din/DM by the end of March,
following the movement of deposits, while the premium black market rate rose by a smaller degree.
In line with the rising black market exchange rate, real money supply continues to decline,
registering at DM 686 million in February, relative to 705 million in January of this year.
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FRY: Main import products, January - February 2000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
O
th
er
 m
o
to
r 
ve
hi
cl
es
fo
r 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 o
f 
p
eo
p
le
C
o
tt
o
n 
th
re
ad
s
(u
nb
le
ac
he
d
)
G
as
 o
il
M
o
to
r 
fu
el
s
in
cl
ud
in
g
 a
vi
at
io
n
M
o
to
r 
ve
hi
cl
es
fo
r 
tr
an
sp
o
rt
 o
f 
p
eo
p
le
E
le
ct
ri
c 
p
o
w
er
mil USD
FRY: Main export products, January - February 2000
0
5
10
15
20
25
A
lu
m
in
iu
m
R
as
p
b
er
ri
es
H
o
t 
ro
lle
d
 p
ro
d
uc
ts
o
f 
un
cl
ad
 ir
o
n
B
ee
ch
 w
o
o
d
, s
aw
n
o
r 
ch
ip
p
ed
 le
ng
th
w
is
e
P
ne
um
at
ic
 t
yr
es
fo
r 
m
o
to
rc
ar
s
M
ed
ic
am
en
ts
 p
ut
up
 f
o
r 
re
ta
il 
sa
le
mil USD
20.0
30 .0
40 .0
50 .0
60 .0
70 .0
80 .0
90 .0
100.0
FRY Bulgaria
1
10
100
100 0
100 00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
FRY Bulgaria
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
mil USD
FRY Bulgaria
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
mil USD
FRY Bulgaria
0
500
100 0
150 0
2000
2500
DGDP
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
mil USD
FRY Bulgaria
GDP GDP per capita
Import
Annual Rate of Inflation
Yugoslavia in the mirror of Eastern Europe
Export
Industrial Production (1989=100)
FRY Bulgaria
USD
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
8 March 2000 Macroeconomic Review
The Economic Bulletin is a cooperative effort of Group 17 & The EastWest Institute – Group 17, Gospodar Jevremova 33, Belgrade, (381 11) 624 669 – EastWest
Institute, Rašínovo nábřeží 78, 120 00 Prague 2, (420 2) 2198 4222 – Milko Stimac & Aaron Presnall, editors – Opinions expressed are the authors’ alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of G17 or EWI _ For information on free email or fax delivery, please visit: www.iews.cz/frytf
